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Zusammenfassung
Der Artikel verweist auf die ethisch-politischen
Dimensionen der postmodernen Philosophie der
Dekonstruktion von Jacques Derrida. Ziel des Ar¬
tikels ist es, die von Derrida aufgewiesene Bezie¬
hung zwischen Dekonstruktion und Gerechtigkeit
zu verdeutlichen. Es wird herausgearbeitet, wie
Derrida das Thema Gerechtigkeit dekonstruiert
und inwiefern er das Verfahren der Dekonstrukti¬
on mit Gerechtigkeit gleichsetzt. Abschließend
wird gezeigt, in welchem Zusammenhang Dekon¬
struktion, Gerechtigkeit und Erziehung stehen.
Summary
This article focuses on the ethical-political di¬
mensions of Jacques Derrida's post-modern philo¬
sophy of Deconstructionism. Its aim is to clanfy
the connection between Deconstructionism and
justice which has been asserted by Derrida. The
article will examine how Derrida deconstructs the
concept of justice and to what extent he equates
the very procedure of Deconstructionism with
justice. It will conclude with a consideration ofthe
relationship between Deconstructionism, justice
and education.
Justice, ifit has to do with the other... is always incalculable. (...) Once you relate to the other as the other,
then something incalculable comes on the scene, something which cannot be reduced to the law or to the
history oflegal structures. This is what gives deconstruction its movement. (Derrida 1997, pp. 17-18)
1 Postmodernism and the question of justice
Among educators and educational theorists there exists a rather widely shared conviction
that postmodern philosophy is unable to provide support for the type of moral and politi¬
cal project that education is (see, e.g., BEYER/LlSTON 1992). Postmodernism, so it can be
heard, „threatens to cripple the very concept of the political in the human and the social
sciences" (McLaren 1986, p. 392). It is „quite dangerous for political struggle, as teach¬
ers and educated practitioners who are trying to make sense of their own daily work, and
that of their students, will recognize" (MORROW/TORRES 1994, p. 58).
The postmodern predicament is perhaps best expressed by Zygmunt Bauman. He ar¬
gues, that the „ethical paradox of the postmodern condition" lies in the fact that postmo¬
dernism „restores to agents the fullness of moral choice and responsibüity while simulta-
neously depriving them of the comfort of the universal guidance that modern self-
confidence once promised" (Bauman 1992, p. xxii). The „irreparable relativism of any
moral code" (ibid.) leads to a Situation where „there are no obvious social agencies that
may guide the choice between indifference and solidarity" (ibid., p. xxiii). It is not dif¬
ficult to see that this poses a fundamental challenge to the possibility for the realization of
the Enlightenment ideals of freedom and social justice.
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Given this, it is not without significance that critical educators like Peter MCLAREN -
who conceives of critical pedagogy as „a politically informed disposition and commit¬
ment to marginalized others in the service of justice and freedom" (MCLAREN 1997, p.
289) - explicitly return to their Marxist roots in order to be able to address „the materia-
list and nondiscursive dimensions of social life" that have become cavalierly dismissed in
a postmodern research climate that seems to have become infatuated „with the primacy of
textual exegesis" (ibid., p. 193).
Doubts about the ethical and political potential of postmodern philosophy are not only
being expressed by educators and (critical) educational theorists. There exists a wider and
much more general concern about this issue. For quite some time now, the work of
Jacques DERRIDA and „his" philosophy of deconstruction2 has been one of the central tar-
gets in this debate. Deconstruction is often accused of being a form of critical analysis
which aims at tearing apart everything it finds on its way. It is seen as a form of textua-
lization - for wasn't it DERRIDA who said that there is nothing outside the text? - with
hyper-relativistic and nihilistic impücations. Deconstruction, so the argument goes, is there¬
fore ethically void, politically impotent, and utterly dangerous (see HABERMAS 1988,
FERRy/Renaut 1990; see also Hoy 1989, Fleming 1996, Giroux/McLaren 1992).
What I want to argue in this article, is that these allegations seriously miss the point -
or better: points (see DERRIDA 1995) - of deconstruction. What I want to make clear, is
that deconstruction is not a skeptical or nihilistic position, but that it has a distinct ethico-
political „horizon" (BERNSTEIN 1992). Over the past years this horizon has become more
and more visible, for which reason some authors now talk about the „ethical turn" of de¬
construction (see Honneth 1994, Baker 1995). Although there are different ways in
which the ethico-political horizon of deconstruction can be characterized, DERRIDA him¬
self has given the most acute and to my opinion also most accurate characterization of
this horizon with his bold but challenging claim that „deconstruction is justice" (DERRIDA
1992a, p. 35). The main aim of this article is to make clear how Derrida's claim about
the intrinsic relationship between deconstruction and justice should be understood. This is
not only meant to explain the logic of DERRIDA's claim. It should also bring into vision
the specific character of the way in which DERRIDA „deals" with the theme ofjustice.
The crucial thing here is, that DERRIDA does not articulate a new theory or a new phi¬
losophy about justice. His writing is rather meant to problematize the very idea of articu-
lating a theory or philosophy „about" something at all. The main problem he brings to the
fore, concerns the question of the site from where one can theorize or philosophize.3
DERRIDA wants to challenge the idea - which he sees as central to Western philosophy -
that theory and philosophy can occupy a neutral place outside of the field that forms their
subject. He wants to argue against the idea of an absolute, uncontaminated outside as the
site of philosophy and theory. The problem is, however, that this claim can not be argued
for in a straightforward way, as this would only be possible if DERRIDA would hold that
his philosophy would be able to escape the predicament. Derrida's writing - which we
can no longer refer to as „a" philosophy in the traditional sense of the word - is, there¬
fore, a writing-from-within. Rather than being a neutral registration of the current State of
Western philosophy, it has to be understood as an Intervention in the course of Western
philosophy, albeit an intervention-from-within. This Intervention, as I will argue, is moti-
vated by an attempt to open up Western philosophy (once again: from the inside) in the
name of what is structurally excluded by it. It is for this very reason, that deconstruction
is not a theory or philosophy about justice; justice is what motivates deconstruction.
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This is not to suggest that what deconstruction has to say about justice will not be of
any significance for the current debates about justice - although, as I will try to make clear
in more detail below, it is a rather specific contribution. If we would want to read
Derrida's writing as a theory about justice - and Derrida would be the first to admit
that his writing would not be able to forbid such a reading - the main thing that comes to
the fore, is that DERRIDA's treatment of justice is not articulated in the socioeconomic
terms that for a long time have occupied a central place in the debates about justice. The
main figure here is, of course, John Rawls, who holds that „the primary subject of justice
is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social insti¬
tutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages
from social Cooperation" (RAWLS 1972, p. 7).
Besides this distributional conception of justice, which takes its point of departure in
socioeconomic injustice and considers some form of redistribution as the road towards
justice, there is an approach to the issue of justice which focusses on what Nancy
FRÄSER (1995) refers to as „cultural or symbolic injustice". The „remedy" for this form
of injustice, which, according to FRÄSER, has become the paradigmatic form of politi¬
cal conflict in the late twentieth Century, is not to be found in redistributive measures. It
lies in the recognition (of, e.g., sexual, cultural, racial, ethnic or national difference).4 If
we consider the distributive and the recognition approach to justice as two ends of a
spectrum (cf. GEWIRTZ 1997), we can see that DERRIDA's „treatment" of the question
of justice might best be placed on the recognition-end of this spectrum. While this re¬
veals that the deconstructive account of justice does not automatically cover the whole
spectrum, I want to suggest that to the extent in which deconstruction points to the
necessity to subvert and interrupt - that is, in short, to deconstruct - any conception of
justice in the very name of justice, it also offers an approach to justice that exceeds the
very spectrum.
In the foUowing pages I will present a rather extensive account of Derrida's writing. I
will first, by means of an introduction, raise the question as to how justice can be done to
Derrida's writing. I will then give a more „technical" account of deconstruction. From
here I will return to DERRIDA's claim that deconstruction is justice. In the concluding
section I will briefly discuss how deconstruction, justice and recognition can be related
(and in fact always already are related) to the question of education. This, so I hope, can
provide a starting point for a reconsideration of the ethical and political possibilities of a
deconstructive understanding of education.
2 Writing after Derrida. Or: How to do justice to Derrida's
writing?5
In more than one sense writing about DERRIDA is an impossible task. Since the sixties,
Derrida has published numerous articles and more than 35 books, and he continues to
write at a speed „that is a little intimidating for his readers" (BENNINGTON 1993, p. 3).
Derrida's work is complex and difficult to read. He writes about, with, against and in/on
the margins of the texts of major thinkers in the Western tradition - such as PLATO,
Aristotle, Kant, Rousseau, Hegel, Nietzsche, Husserl, Freud and Heidegger -
both explicitly and between the lines. His writing often breaks with the conventional, lin-
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ear presentation of philosophical argument and contains multiple experiments with typo-
graphy, punctuation and pictorial form.
But the problem of writing about DERRIDA is not just a technical problem. It is not just
the problem of finding a way to represent a corpus that can hardly be represented because
of its scale. It is not just the problem of conveying the original meaning of an oeuvre that
is complex and unconventional. For it is precisely the assumption that meaning can be
grasped in its original moment, that meaning can be represented in the form of some
proper, self-identical concept, that DERRIDA is most determinedly out to challenge.
This helps to understand why DERRIDA's writing is often unconventional and oblique.
DERRIDA's writing is a „writing on writing" (DERRIDA 1983, p. 45) that doesn't want to
betray itself, that doesn't want to restore the kind of order it puts into question. At the
very same time, however, it is precisely this which makes writing about DERRIDA into a
Catch-22, because getting DERRIDA „right", that is giving the final representation of the
original meaning of his oeuvre, is at the very same time not getting him right.
This Catch-22 is not simply the last word about DERRIDA and deconstruction. For we
might argue that the very i'mpossibility of getting Derrida right is precisely what opens
up the possibility of writing about Derrida in the first place (see Bennington 1993, p.
15, p. 38). At this stage we can at least imagine that if our writing were to be identical
with Derrida's writing, it would be impossible to recognize it as writing about Derrida
(it would not even count as writing about Derrida). In order to „re-present" Derrida's
writing, in order to say the same thing as he says, in order to capture his writing in its sin-
gularity, we are therefore obliged to say something different.
Both among followers and critics of DERRIDA there are those who have taken this to
mean that deconstruction is a kind of „hermeneutics free-for-all" (NORRIS 1987, p. 139), a
joyous release from all the rules and constraints of interpretation and understanding. But
this interpretation, which suggests that deconstruction is basically a skeptical position,
overlooks a crucial „movement" in Derrida's writing.
It is true, that DERRIDA has challenged the common understanding of writing and
reading as two oppositional activities, one actively producing, the other passively con-
suming. DERRIDA points to a certain complicity between writing and reading, in that a
text needs to be read in order to be or become a text. This implies that writing - and
human communication more generally - always entails a risk: the risk of misunder-
standing.
If this were all there is to say, it might be correct to conclude that DERRIDA simply
wants to invert the Opposition between understanding and misunderstanding, so that the
latter would henceforth take priority over the former and would thereby become the rule
or the law. But this interpretation overlooks the fact that DERRIDA has not so much ques¬
tioned the possibility of understanding as such, but first and foremost the way in which
we conceive of the relationship between understanding and misunderstanding.
This relationship is commonly understood as a binary Opposition, an Opposition of two,
mutually exclusive options. The Opposition implies a hierarchy in that understanding is
considered to be the normal Situation and misunderstanding the aberration. Understanding
thus defines what „real" or „successful" reading is, while misunderstanding is conceived
as the distortion of this normal Situation, a distortion that comes from without. As soon as
it is acknowledged, however, that misunderstanding is always possible (which is not the
same as saying that it is always the case), we need to ask whether we can still hold that
misunderstanding constitutes an accident, that it is a risk that befalls communication from
Zeitschrift für Erziehungswissenschaft, 1. Jahrg., Heft 3/1998, S. 395-411 399
without. According to DERRIDA this is not the case. He argues that misunderstanding is as
much a part of language and communication, is as much on the „inside", as understanding
is (DERRIDA 1988, pp. 15-17). It is „a general possibility inscribed in the structure of
positivity, of normality, ofthe ,standard'" (ibid., p. 157).
From this it follows that the idea of normal communication as successful understand¬
ing is not a fact, but rather an „ethical and teleological determination" of what normal
communication is (ibid., p. 17). This means that the purity of normal communication can
only be maintained by an act of exclusion. This not only reveals - and here we encounter
a characteristic deconstructive movement - that what one tries to keep outside of com¬
munication (viz., misunderstanding) inhabits the inside. DERRIDA also holds that there
would not even be an inside without that fact. We might say, therefore, that the term
excluded by the binary divide (understanding versus misunderstanding) returns in some
sense to sign the act of its own exclusion. And, even more important, that this apparent
complicity is precisely what outlaws the legality of this exclusion in the first place (see
Bennington 1993, pp. 217-218; see also Derrida 1981a, pp. 41-42).
This reveals that deconstruction is far from an attempt to make misunderstanding the
rule or the law. DERRIDA only wants to make clear that the structural possibility of misun¬
derstanding must be taken into account when describing so-called normality, and, so he
adds, „that this possibility can neither be excluded nor opposed" (DERRIDA 1988, p. 157).
The condition of possibility of communication can therefore neither be found in pure un¬
derstanding (or pure misunderstanding), nor in some higher unity of understanding and
misunderstanding. What Derrida rather wants to bring into view is the ultimate un-
decidabiüty of this Opposition, an undecidability which cannot be traced back to some
original, pure unity, but which itself is always already at work.
The foregoing makes clear, that misunderstanding is the essential and hence necessary
risk of all communication and interpretation. There is only one way to evade this risk,
which is not to engage in an act of reading or interpretation at all. While this might be the
only way to be absolutely respectful of the singularity of Derrida's writing, it makes this
singularity opaque, silent, unidentifiable and unrecognizable at the very same time.
This means, then, that for the singular to be possible as a singularity, it must take the
risk of a „repetition in alterity" (BENNINGTON 1993, p. 86), the risk of misunderstanding,
the risk of translation - „and for the notion of translation we would have to Substitute a no¬
tion of transformation" (DERRIDA 1981a, p. 20). Only this „repetition in alterity" opens up
the possibility for the singular to be recognized in its irreducible singularity and thus the
possibility to do justice to the singular. Here we encounter what GASCHE (1994, pp. 14-15)
refers to as „the law of singularity", which is the inevitable dissingularization of the singular
through the repetition without which it could not hope to secure its singularity.
Reading Derrida and writing about Derrida therefore means translating Derrida.
Translation is not the transmission or reproduction of an original meaning that preceded
it, because the originality of the original only comes into view (and Derrida would add:
only comes into existence; see, e.g., DERRIDA 1988) after it has been translated. Transla¬
tion, then, might best be understood as a response, a response to the singularity of the text
(see GASCHE 1994, pp. 227-250). For this response to be a genuine response, it has to be
singular itself (a „response without norms"; Derrida/Ewald 1995, p. 289), and not just
a repetition of the text or a response preprogrammed by the text. This implies that a gen¬
uine response has all the allure of irresponsibility: it is singular, untranslatable, and never
an unconditional affirmation. And yet, for a response to be genuine and responsive it also
400 G.J.J. Biesta: Deconstruction, justice and the question of education
has to be responsible in that it needs to do justice to the singularity of the text (not in the
least because the survival of the text is dependent on this response).
Writing about Derrida therefore means responding to DERRIDA in order to do justice
to Derrida's writing. How can this be achieved? Let me begin again.
3 From metaphysics to the other
3.1 The myth of the origin
The theme that runs through Derrida's writing right from the beginning is the theme of
the origin. Or, to be more precise: the theme of the thought of the origin, the theme of the
philosophy of the origin, the theme, in short, of metaphysics.
Derrida argues, that the history of Western philosophy is one continuous attempt to lo-
cate a fundamental ground, a fixed permanent center, an Archimedean point, which serves
both as an absolute beginning and as a center from which everything originating from it can
be mastered and controUed. An origin which „closes off the play which it opens up and
makes possible" (Derrida 1978, p. 279). Since Plato, this origin has always been de-
fined of in terms of presence. The origin is thought of as fully present to itself and as to-
tally self-sufficient. It is identical to itself and in this respect it conforms to the logic of
identity. The „determination of Being as presence", DERRIDA holds, is the „matrix" ofthe
history of metaphysics (which coincides with the history of the West in general) (see
DERRIDA 1978, p. 279).6
The „metaphysics of presence" (DERRIDA 1978, p. 281) includes more than just the
determination of the meaning of Being as presence. The metaphysical gesture of Western
philosophy includes a hierarchical axiology in which the origin is designated as pure,
simple, normal, Standard, self-sufficient and self-identical, in order then to think in terms
of derivation, complication, deterioration, accident etcetera.7 This is „the metaphysical
exigency", that which has been „the most constant, most profound and most potent"
(Derrida 1988, p. 93).
DERRIDA's writing wants to put this metaphysical gesture into question. He acknowl¬
edges that he is not the first to do so. NIETZSCHE, FREUD and HEIDEGGER have all in their
own way exposed and criticized the metaphysical desire, the desire for fixed, self-present
origins, of Western philosophy (see DERRIDA 1978, p. 280). But there is a crucial differ-
ence between NIETZSCHE's „demolition" or HEIDEGGER's „destruction" of metaphysics
and the work Derrida is engaged in. Derrida argues that Nietzsche, Freud, Heideg¬
ger, and all the other „destructive discourses" wanted to make a total break with the
metaphysical tradition. They wanted to end and to overcome metaphysics. DERRIDA teils
us, however, that such a rupture is not a real possibility.
There is no sense in doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We ... can
pronounce not a Single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip into the form, the logic,
and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest. (Derrida 1978, p. 280)
While DERRIDA definitely wants to „shake" metaphysics, he acknowledges that this can¬
not be done from some neutral and innocent place outside of metaphysics. What is more
to the point, to put it simply, is to say that Derrida wants to shake metaphysics by show-
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ing that it is itself always already „shakmg", by showing, in other words, the impossibility
of any of its attempts to fix or immobilize being through the presentation of a self-
sufficient, self-identical presence.
This implies that deconstruction is not something that is applied to the texts of the meta¬
physical tradition from the outside. It is, therefore, „not a method and cannot be trans-
formed into one" (DERRIDA 1991, p 273) Rather
„deconstructions", which I prefer to use in its plural form is one of the possible names to designate, in
short by metonymy, what occurs [ce qui arrive], or cannot manage to occur [ce qui n'airtve pas a arri-
\er\, namely a certain dislocation which in effect reiterates itself regularly - and everywhere where there
is something rather than nothing (Derrida/Ewald 1995, pp 287-288)
3 2 The presence of the voice
One of the most pervasive ways in which the metaphysics of presence has been present in
Western philosophy, is in the form of the pnvilegmg of voice as the medium of meaning
and the consequent dismissal of wnting as derivative and inessential This order is based
upon a rather straightforward logic in which spoken words are seen as the Symbols of
mental experience, and written words as the symbols of spoken words The pnonty of
spoken language over written or silent language stems from the fact that when words are
spoken, the Speaker and the hstener are supposed to be simultaneously present to one
another Wnting, on the other hand, is considered to be subversive in so far as it creates a
spatial and temporal distance between the author and its audience
DERRIDA refers to the privüege of the voice over wnting as phonocentrism Phonocen-
tnsm, he argues, is in a sense a necessity, in that it is a phenomenon that not only occurs
in Western culture, but can also be found in other cultures (see DERRIDA 1984, pp 115-
116) What is, however, a „umquely Western phenomenon" is the translation of pho¬
nocentrism into a metaphysical system which assigns the origin of truth to speech or lo¬
gos (Derrida 1976, p. 3) Derrida discusses this specifically Western response to the
„phonocentnc necessity" under the name of logocentrism (see DERRIDA 1983, p 40)
The deconstruction of logocentrism occupies a central place in Derrida's „earher"
wntings, where he raises the question whether it is possible to articulate the presence of
speech (or speech as presence) in such a way that it is self-sufficient, simple, identical
with and present to itself, in such a way, in short, that it is pure and uncontarmnated by
what it is not, namely wnting
„PLATO's Pharmacy", a long section m Dissemination, takes up the question of the pnon¬
ty of speech over wnting in the form of a close reading of PLATO's dialogue the Phaedrus
(see Derrida 1981b, pp. 61-171) Plato's text presents itself as an attempt to articulate the
pnonty of speech over wnting and to show the philosophical, moral and pohtical dangers of
thinking to invert that pnonty What DERRIDA's reading of the Phaedrus reveals, however,
is precisely the failure of the text to achieve what it argues. Most obvious in this respect is,
of course, the fact that Plato argues for the infenor character of wnting by means of wnt¬
ing itself This predicament, which repeats itself wherever philosophy refuses to acknowl-
edge its own textual status and aspires to a pure contemplaüon of truth, it is a common pat¬
tern in the history of Western thought, for which reason we might say that logocentnsm is
first of all „the desire not to recognize this order of necessity" (NORRIS 1987, p 127)
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What DERRIDA reveals in his reading of the Phaedrus - although this is far from the
only place in his work where the point is made
- is the impossibility of articulating the
Opposition between speech and writing as a stable Opposition in which speech is the pure
and self-sufficient origin and writing its derivative, completely opposite and completely
extemal to speech. What his „deconstructive reading" makes clear is that the presence of
speech (as origin) cannot be articulated without the „help" of that what is thought of and
defined as totally different from speech, without the „help" of what is absent.
It will be clear from what we have seen so far, that this should not be understood as a
plea for the inversion of the Opposition between speech and writing. After all, such an in-
version would only replace one origin (speech) for another (writing), but would leave the
metaphysical order itself, the order of original presence versus derivative absence, in its
place. What DERRIDA attempts to bring into view, is the ultimate undecidability of the
oppositions that constitute and govern this order (an undecidability which, contrary to
Hegelian dialectics, can never be resolved in a „third term"; see DERRIDA 1981a, p. 43),
and thereby the ultimate impossibility of articulating anything whatsoever as a pure, un-
contaminated, self-present origin.
3.3 The ubiquity of writing
And yet there is a sense in which DERRIDA does argue that „language is first ... writing"
(Derrida 1976, p. 37) - a sense which immediately follows from the impossibility to
grasp a pure, uncontaminated self-present origin. To understand why this is so, we need
to follow Derrida in his exposure of logocentrism in the traditional (that is metaphysi¬
cal) theory of meaning. According to this theory, meaning is a relation of identity be¬
tween a word and an object. Stated in more technical terms, a sign is a word. The sign
„cow" is made up of the sound „cow", the signifier, and the concept or meaning of
„cow", the signified. (The actual animal is the referent.)
The relation between the signifier and the signified is understood in terms of represen¬
tation. The signifier re-presents the signified, or, to be more precise: the signifier re¬
presents the presence of the signified. This implies that the presence of the signified is the
origin of and the wanant for the meaning of the signifier. However, in order to serve as
origin and wanant, the signified itself has to be ««signified and ««represented. It has to
be what DERRIDA calls a „transcendental signified". The fact that the traditional theory of
meaning depends upon the existence of an unsignified or transcendental signified reveals
its logocentric character. As DERRIDA reminds us, „I have identified logocentrism and the
metaphysics of presence as the exigent, powerful, systematic, and inepressible desire for
such a signified" (Derrida 1976, p. 49).
But although it is a powerful desire, a desire so powerful that it has been able to exert
its influence on almost every corner of Western thought, it is, as Derrida attempts to
show again and again, a desire that gets stuck in its own presuppositions. In its most sim¬
ple form, this is, because for the transcendental signified to be articulated as a presence,
as an origin, it needs to be signified. But if this is so, then it follows that „every signified
is also in the position of a signifier" (DERRIDA 1981a, p. 20), that - in short - „the thing
itself is a sign" (DERRIDA 1976, p. 49).
According to the phonocentric order, speech is a sign of an original presence (for ex¬
ample of a thought), and writing is the signification of speech. The derivative character of
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writing can therefore be expressed by saying that writing is „a sign of a sign". As soon as
it is acknowledged that the original, the thing itself is a sign, then it follows that even the
first act of signification is not the signification of an original but of something which is it¬
self already signified. It follows, in other words, that the first act of signification already
operates in the field of the sign of a sign. It is in this („vulgär") sense that Derrida holds
that „language is first... writing".8
3.4 Difference and dijferance
Precisely at this point we encounter one of the most complex, though intriguing, di¬
mensions of Derrida's writing. The problem, stated simply, is that as soon as it is
acknowledged that there are no simple, unsignified, transcendental signifiers that fix and
wanant the meaning of our words, that there are no Originals to which our words can re¬
fer, we come in a position where even this acknowledgement itself seems to have become
„floating". The metaphysical tradition had tried to deal with this problem by „forgetting"
the textual status of its own writing, by assuming that it was possible to occupy a place
outside of the order of writing. DERRIDA's writing occurs beyond this naivety. But he also
acknowledges that there cannot be a total rupture, because such a rupture would deprive
us of the very means to criticize metaphysics. Which puts DERRIDA in the awkward posi¬
tion „of having to account for an enor by means of tools derived from that very enor"
(JOHNSON 1981, p. X).
Derrida tackles this predicament with the help of a theory of signs and of language
developed by Ferdinand DE SAUSSURE. Contrary to the idea that language is essentially a
naming process, attaching words to things, DE SAUSSURE argues that language is a Sys¬
tem, or a stracture, where any individual dement is meaningless outside the confines of
that structure. In language, he holds, there are only differences. But - and here the ideas
of de Saussure coincide with Derrida's deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence
- these differences are not differences between positive terms, that is between terms that
in and by themselves refer to objects or things outside of the system. In language, DE
SAUSSURE argues, there are only differences without positive terms (see DE SAUSSURE
1974).
But if this is so, if there are no positive terms (which is the same as saying that there
are no transcendental signifieds), then it follows that we can no longer articulate the differ-
ential character of language itself by means of a positive term either. Difference without
positive terms implies that this dimension must itself always remain unperceived, for
strictly speaking, it is unconceptualizable. It is a difference that cannot be brought back
into the order of the same and, through a signifier, given an identity. This means, then,
that „the play of difference, which, as SAUSSURE reminded us, is the condition for the
possibility and functioning of every sign, is in itself a silent play" (DERRIDA 1982, p. 5).
If, however, we want to articulate that which does not let itself be articulated and yet is
the condition for the possibility of all articulation - which we might at least want to do in
order to prevent metaphysics from re-entering the field - we must first of all acknowledge
that there can never be a word or a concept to represent this silent play. We must also
acknowledge that this play cannot simply be exposed, for „one can expose only that
which at a certain moment can become present" (ibid., p. 5). And finally we must acknowl¬
edge that there is nowhere to begin, „for what is put into question is precisely the quest
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for a rightful beginning, an absolute point of departure" (DERRIDA 1982, p. 6). All this,
and more, is acknowledged in the new „word" or „concept" - „which is neither a word
nor a concept" (ibid., p. 7) but a „neographism" (ibid., p. 13) - of differance.
The reason why DERRIDA introduces that „what is written as differance" (ibid., p. 11)
is not difficult to grasp. For although „the play of difference" is identified as the condition
for the possibility of all conceptuality, we should not make the mistake to think that we
have finally found the real origin of conceptuality, that, in other words, this play is a
playful but nonetheless transcendental signified. Strictly speaking, there is only one way
to avoid this mistake, which is by acknowledging that the differences that constitute the
play of difference „are themselves effects" (ibid.). As DERRIDA argues:
What is written as differance, then, will be the playing movement that „produces" - by means of some¬
thing that is not simply an activity - these differences, these effects of difference. This does not mean
that the differance that produces differences is somehow before them, in a simple and unmodified - in¬
different - present. Differance is the non-full, non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differ¬
ences. Thus, the name „origin" no longer suits. (Derrida 1982, p. 11)
3.5 Deconstruction and the other
Derrida' s „attack" on Western metaphysics might seem to be a highly technical enter-
prise, a discussion among philosophers with no other issue at stake than the future of
Western philosophy itself. While there is some truth in such an evaluation, there is definitely
more at stake than just this. What is crucial to acknowledge, is that Derrida's attack on
the metaphysical tradition is aimed at dismantling our preconceived understanding of
identity as self-sufficient presence, in order to expose us to the challenge of hitherto con-
cealed, excluded and suppressed otherness; an otherness which has been ignored in order
to preserve the very illusion of identity as self-sufficient presence. DERRIDA's writing re¬
veals that the otherness which is excluded and suppressed in order to maintain the myth
of a pure and uncontaminated original presence, is actually constitutive for that which
presents itself as pure, self-sufficient, self-present, and therefore as totally different from
this otherness. What the deconstruction of logocentrism reveals, is - to put it in a nutshell
(see CAPUTO 1997a) - that „identity presupposes alterity" (Derrida 1984, p. 117).
Although we might say, like Derrida, that the deconstruction of logocentrism is a
search for „the other of language" (ibid., p. 123), deconstruction is not exclusively or
primarily concerned with a linguistic problematic. The question of alterity is first and fore-
most the question of the concrete other, of „the other, which is beyond language" (ibid.,
p. 123). It is for precisely this reason, that we can say that deconstruction is not a negative
but rather an affirmative „philosophy", that it is not a nihilistic „enclosure in nothing-
ness", but rather „an openness towards the other" (ibid., p. 124).
At this point it becomes clear how closely Derrida's writing is connected to the wri¬
ting of Emmanuel LEVINAS, whose work Stands out as an unprecedented attempt in twen-
tieth Century philosophy to articulate what it means to do justice to the other as what the
other is, namely: other.10 The central insight of LEVlNAS's writing, is that Western phi¬
losophy has been unable to recognize the alterity of the other because it understands the
relation between man and world primarily as an epistemological relation, a relation where
an isolated, self-present mind or ego attempts to get accurate knowledge of the external
world. LEVINAS refers to this gesture of Western philosophy, in which the ego or subject
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is the origin of all knowledge and meaning, as egology. The main consequence of this
epistemological preoccupation, is that the other can only appear as an object of knowl¬
edge. For something to be (or become) an object of knowledge, it has to be conceptuali-
zed, which means that it has to be identified as an instance of some general concept. But
if the other is always thought as an instance of something more general and as a result of
the ego's act of conceptualization, it can never appear in its „radical alterity", it can never
appear as „absolutely-other", as unique and irreducible singular; it can never appear as
what it is, namely: other (see LEVINAS 1979).
For LEVINAS this means that if we want to recognize the other in its alterity, we must
reverse the philosophical order and take the encounter with the absolutely-other as our
point of departure and not any metaphysical determination of being. It is for precisely this
reason that LEVINAS argues that ethics is „first philosophy". This reversal, as DERRIDA
argues in his essay on the thought of LEVINAS (see DERRIDA 1978, pp. 79-153), implies
that we cannot say
- but also do not have to wonder - what this encounter is.
There is no way to conceptualize this encounter: it is made possible by the other, the unforeseeable
„resistant to all categories." Concepts suppose an anticipation, a horizon within which alterity is amor-
tized as soon as it is announced precisely because it has let itself be foreseen. The infinitely-other cannot
be bound by a concept, cannot be thought on the basis of a horizon; for a horizon is always a horizon of
the same, the elementary unity within which eruptions and surprises are always welcomed by under¬
standing and recognized. (Derrida 1978, p. 95)
It is because of this, that DERRIDA argues that the affirmative character of deconstruction
is not merely positive, i.e., not merely an affirmation of what already exists. Decon¬
struction is an affirmation of what is wholly other (tout autre), of what is unforseeable
from the present, and what is beyond the horizon of the same. It is an affirmation of an
other that is always to come, as an event which „as event, exceeds calculation, rules, pro¬
grams, anticipations and so forth" (DERRIDA 1992a, p. 27). More than simple being an
openness towards the other, deconstruction is an openness towards the unforeseeable in-
coming (l'invention; invention) ofthe other (see Caputo 1997a, p. 42).
Yet, and here there appears a decisive difference between Derrida and Levinas,
Derrida raises the question whether Levinas can consistently hold that the only way to
do justice to the alterity of the other is by resisting any conceptualization. Derrida de¬
nies that this can be done. „One could neither speak, nor have any sense of the totally
other", he argues, „if there was not a phenomenon of the totally other, or evidence of the
totally other as such" (Derrida 1978, p. 123). He refers to this necessity as transcenden¬
tal violence (see DERRIDA 1978, pp. 118-133). This is violence, because it presents the
non-representable other (as other). It is transcendental because this representation is the
very condition of possibility of any encounter with the other.
LEVINAS definitely wants to escape this predicament (see BENNINGTON 1993, p. 311).
Derrida, in a by now familiär gesture, not only shows that Levinas' writing about the
absolutely-other is already a betrayal of this desire (see DERRIDA 1978, p. 151). Even mo¬
re crucial is the fact, that Derrida, not only denies along with Levinas the pure, un-
contaminated originality of the ego as self-presence, but also - and this time against
LEVINAS - the pure, uncontaminated originality of the (presence of the) other.
406 G.J.J. Biesta: Deconstruction, justice and the question of education
4 Deconstruction is justice
In the preceding two sections I have crossed deconstruction in two different ways. If some¬
thing can be concluded from these crossings, it is that deconstruction cannot be presented
as a position (and in that sense it is not „a" philosophy). It has to be understood as an oc¬
cunence - or even more precise: it has to be understood in its occunence. What is at stake
in the occunence of deconstraction, is the attempt to bring into view the impossibility to
articulate a self-sufficient, self-present center from which everything can be mastered,
controUed and totalized. What the occunence of deconstraction reveals, in other words, is
that identity presupposes alterity. It reveals, that every inside has a constitutive outside
which is not merely extemal but always in a sense already inhabits the inside, so that self-
sufficiency or self-presence can only be brought about by an act of exclusion. What gives
deconstruction its motive and drive is precisely the concern for, or more specifically, the
wish to do justice to, that which is excluded. Here we can already begin to appreciate why
DERRIDA Claims that deconstruction is justice (DERRIDA 1992a, p. 15).
The complexity of deconstraction lies in what I propose to call the problem of reflex-
ivity of deconstraction, i.e., the fact that its conclusions constantly subvert its assertions.
How, for example, is it possible not to totalize the non-totalizable? How not to concep-
tualize the unconceptualizable? How not to speak? But rather than simply evading these
aporias - which has been the common strategy of Western philosophy, placing itself out¬
side of the scene of representation - deconstruction faces them head on and tries to make
its strength out of it. This is clearly revealed in DERRIDA's articulation of the ethical and
political horizon of deconstruction.
In his chapter in Deconstruction and the possibility ofjustice (Derrida 1992a) DERRIDA
confesses that ethical and political issues have not occupied a prominent place in most of his
writings. He acknowledges that „there are no doubt many reasons why the majority of texts
hastily identified as „deconstractionist" ... seem, I do say seem, not to foreground the theme
ofjustice (as theme, precisely), or the theme of ethics and politics" (DERRIDA 1992a, p. 7).
Yet, so he continues, it was normal, foreseeable, and desirable that studies of decon¬
structive style should culminate in this problematic. In fact, deconstraction has done no¬
thing but address this problematic, if only „obliquely", since „one cannot speak directly
about justice, thematize or objectivize justice, say ,this is just' and even less ,1 am just"
(Derrida 1992a, p. 10). That is to say, one cannot do all this „without immediately be-
traying justice" (ibid.). Why is this so?
The clue to Derrida's answer lies in the contention that justice is always directed to¬
wards the other. Justice, DERRIDA argues, is „the relation to the other". Saying, therefore,
that something is just, or that one is just, is a betrayal of the very idea of justice to the ex¬
tent to which it forecloses the possibility for the other to decide whether justice has in¬
deed been rendered. If justice is a concern for the other as other, for the otherness of the
other, for an otherness that, by definition, we can neither foresee nor totalize; if justice, in
short, always addresses itself to the singularity" ofthe other (DERRIDA 1992a, p. 20), we
are obliged - in the very name of justice - to keep the unforseen possibility of the in-
coming of the other, the surprise of the „invention" of the other open (see DERRIDA
1989). This means, that the very possibility of justice is sustained by its impossibility. For
this reason, DERRIDA argues that justice is „an experience of the impossible", where -
and this is crucial - the impossible is not that which is not possible, but rather that which
cannot be foreseen as a possibility (DERRIDA 1992a, p. 16).
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The implications of this insight are not restricted to the determination of whether a Si¬
tuation or a person is just, but extend to the very definition ofjustice itself. Here again we
can say that it is for the very sake of justice as a concem for the otherness of the other,
that we can never decide once and for all - i.e., for all possible and impossible others -
what justice is. Justice, therefore, is not a principle or a criterion (as this would mean that
we would know right now what justice is), nor an ideal (as this would mean that we
would now be able to describe the future Situation of justice), not even a regulative ideal
(which would still imply a description of what justice is, although with the implication
that the ideal is not expected to be ever present in some future). It belongs to the very
„structure" of justice that it never can be present and therefore never will be present. It is
by necessity, as DERRIDA would say, a justice to come, which means that it is always to
come (DERRIDA 1992a, p. 27).
The impossibility of justice is not to be understood as „a" deconstraction of justice. To
understand why this is so, we need to observe DERRIDA's distinction between justice and
the law (droit, loi). By the law Derrida means the positive structures that make up judi-
cial Systems, in virtue of which actions are said to be legal, legitimate, or properly author-
ized. The law is „essentially deconstructible" because the law is constructed in the first
place (see DERRIDA 1992a, pp. 14-15). The fact that the law is deconstructible „is not bad
news" (ibid., p. 14). „We may even see in this a stroke of luck for politics, for all histori¬
cal progress" (ibid.), because it opens up the possibility to improve the law.
(The) law as such can be deconstructed and has to be deconstructed. That is the condition of historicity,
revolution, morals, ethics, and progress. But justice is not the law. Justice is what gives us the impulse,
the drive, or the movement to improve the law, that is, to deconstruct the law. Without a call for justice
we would not have any interest in deconstructing the law. (Derrida 1997, p. 16)
Deconstruction, in short, is aimed at the improvement of the law in the name of that
which has no name, namely justice.
The fact that justice is not a criterion or a principle means that it is not something that
we can have knowledge about and that we only need to apply. The law is applicable. We
can see that we act in agreement with norms, with the law. But, so DERRIDA argues, to
speak ofjustice is not a matter of knowledge, of theoretical judgement.
Justice, if it has to do with the other ... is always incalculable. (...) Once you relate to the other as the
other, then something incalculable comes on the scene, something which cannot be reduced to the law or
to the history of legal structures. This is what gives deconstruction its movement (Derrida 1997, pp.
17-18).
The claim that justice is not a criterion, that it has no ground, so that at the basis of all our
decisions lies a radical undecidability which cannot be closed off by our decisions or judge-
ments, but which „continues to inhabit the decision" (DERRIDA 1996, p. 87), could be
read as the contention that in the end, and despite all that it Claims, deconstraction is de¬
structive and relativistic. But this of course only holds, when we assume that ethics and
politics can only exist on some firm ground.
Against such a foundationalist point of view DERRIDA argues that ethics and politics
only begin when this undecidability, which makes the decision at the very same time
„necessary and impossible", is acknowledged. For him, therefore, deconstraction is a
„hyper-politicization" (DERRIDA 1996, p. 85; cf. BlESTA 1995). DERRIDA acknowledges
that this is an aporia - but „we must not hide it from ourselves" (DERRIDA 1992b, p. 41).
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I will even venture to say that ethics, politics, and responsibüity, ;/ there are any, will only ever have
begun with the experience and experiment of the aporia. When the path is clear and given, when a cer¬
tain knowledge opens up the way in advance, the decisiort is already made, it might as well be said that
there is none to make; irresponsibly, and in good conscience, one simply applies or implements a pro¬
gram. (...) It makes of action the applied consequence, the simple application of a knowledge or know-
how. It makes of ethics and politics a technology. No longer of the order of practical reason or decision,
it begins to be irresponsible. (ibid., pp. 41, 45)
Perhaps, DERRIDA adds, one never escapes the program. But in that case „one must
acknowledge this and stop talking with authority about moral or political responsibihty"
(ibid., p. 41). This means, therefore, that „the condition of possibility of this thing called
responsibüity is a certain experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible:
the testing of the aporia from which one may invent the only possible invention, the im¬
possible invention" (ibid.).
It is from here that I want to make my final remarks about deconstruction, justice, recog¬
nition and the question of education.
5 Just education, to begin with
The first thing to be acknowledged, is that the relationship between deconstruction and edu¬
cation is not an accidental one. In so far as education is more than just a technical enterprise,
in so far as the meaning of education exceeds enculturation and socialization, in so far, then,
as education is more than mere preparation and domestication, it is precisely concerned with
otherness, precisely concerned with the impossible possibiüty of the invention of the other.
After all, the newbom child is not a mere repetition of what already exists. The newborn
child, the „newcomer",: as Hannah ARENDT reminds us, „possesses the capacity of begin¬
ning something anew" (ARENDT 1958, p. 9) and it is education „where we decide whether
we love our children enough not ... to strike from their hands their chance of undertaking
something new, something unforseen by us" (ARENDT 1968, p. 196).
Education, so we could say, is the experience of the singularity of the other. This claim
can be understood in strictly moral terms, i.e., as the contention that educators have an
Obligation to do justice to the child. Yet the very fact that education can never be merely
technique that only has to be applied for the very reason that the other is always the limit
of our efforts to education, already reveals that education always has to reckon with the
invention, the in-coming of the other (see, e.g., DONALD 1992, MASSCHELElN/WlMMER
1996, Biesta 1997, Biesta in press). How, then, can education be just?
One way to approach this question is through the idea of transcendental violence. Of
course we could argue that the only way to justice to the other, to the singularity of the
other, is by leaving the other alone. It is not difficult to see that this neglect would make
the other unidentifiable and unrecognizable. This would definitely block the invention of
the other, and would therefore be utterly unjust as the other would not be recognized. For
education to be just, therefore, some form of recognition must take place.
It will be clear from the foregoing pages, however, that such a recognition can never be
merely positive, that it can never be a recognition of something that already exists. The
very act of recognition, so we could say, is at the very same time necessary and violent, it
is at the very same time that which makes justice possible and that which, for being vio-
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lent, also carries an element of injustice with it. In this sense the conclusion can only be
that the possibility ofjust education is always sustained by its impossibility.
Derrida makes a similar point about ethical decisions. While ethical decisions are im¬
possible, they can, for the very reason of their being ethical decisions, not wait. This
„aporia of urgency" (Derrida 1992a, p. 26) means that the instance of decision is a
„madness" (ibid.). One has to decide, but a just decision is impossible. And yet, it is this
very mad impossibility which only makes justice possible. How can we give a place to
this madness? Perhaps, as EDGOOSE (1998) suggests, it is enough - or at least something
- if we are attentive to the hesitation that inhabits our decisions. Justice could perhaps come
from the „failure of fluency", that is, from „ethical hesitation" (ibid.). Just education has to
be on the outlook for the impossible invention of the other. The other, DERRIDA writes, „is
not the possible." The other is „precisely what is not invented" (DERRIDA 1989, pp. 59-60).
This means, that „deconstructive inventiveness can consist only in opening, in uncloseting,
destabilizing foreclosionary structures so as to allow for the passage toward the other"
(ibid.). But one does not make the other come, one lets it come by preparing for its Coming.
We must, therefore, „prepare for the incalculable" (CAPUTO 1997b, p. 76). Hesitation - at-
tentiveness to hesitation - could perhaps open up just enough space for the impossible in¬
vention of the other, for the impossible possibility ofjust education.
Notes
1 An earlier Version of this paper was read at the seminar on Civic Education, Civil Society and Citi¬
zenship at the Institute for Educational Research of the University of Oslo. I would like to thank Lars
L0VLIE, Joseph Dünne, Nel Noddings, Helgard Mahrdt and the participants to the seminar for their
challenging comments and suggestions. Preparation for this paper was partly supported by a Spencer
Postdoctoral Fellowship from the Spencer Foundation and the National Academy of Education, USA.
2 „I use this word for the sake of a rapid convenience, though it is a word I have never liked and one
whose fortune has disagreeably surprised me" (Derrida 1983, p. 44), „however, as time passes, and
when I see so many people trying to get rid of this word, I ask myself whether there is not perhaps
something in it" (Derrida 1996, p. $5).
3 In an interview, Derrida defines the „central question" of his writing as follows: „from what site or
non-site (non-lieu) philosophy [can] as such appear to itself as other than itself, so that it can interro-
gate and reflect upon itself in an original manner" (Derrida 1984, p. 108).
4 Fräser (see 1995) gives an interesting analysis of the interactions between socioeconomic and cultural
injustice, and the accompanying redistribution-recognition dilemma.
5 In this and the foUowing section I draw on my forthcoming chapter on Derrida and education in
Poststructuralism and Educational Discourse, edited by J. Marshall (Durban in preparation).
6 „It could be shown that all the names related to fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have al¬
ways designated an invariable presence - eidos, arche, telos, energeia, ousia (essence, existence,
substance, subject) aletheia, transcendentality, consciousness, God, man, and so forth" (Derrida
1978, pp. 279-280).
7 „All metaphysicians, from Plato to Rousseau, Descartes to Husserl, have proceeded in this way,
conceiving good to be before evil, the positive before the negative, the pure before the impure, the
simple before the complex, the essential before the accidental, the imitated before the Imitation, etc."
(Derrida 1988, p. 93).
8 Although we should immediately add that this is not writing in the traditional, logocentric under¬
standing ofthe word. Derrida calls it ,arche-writing' (Derrida 1976, p. 56) and refers to the science
of this writing as .Grammatology' (Derrida 1976).
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9 In French the difference between ,difference' and ,differance is inaudible, which implies that this
neographism is itself already a Subversion of phonocentnsm
10 Derrida contends that he is prepared to agree with everything Levinas says, and that the differences
between them are of a biographical and not of a philosophical nature (see Derrida 1986, pp 74-75)
11 The singular is that which can not be subsumed under the universal
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